This article explores the transition from democratic innovation to institutionalised political process of e-participatory budgeting in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. Applying a multimethod approach (content analysis, interviews and social media monitoring) regarding the last three editions (2008, 2011 and 2013), it considers how the proponents and organisers of ePB conceive its function in relation to the representative mechanisms that surround it; how the citizens of Belo Horizonte have responded to it in relation to their experience of being represented; and how governments seeking to institutionalise democratic innovations with a view to establishing more direct forms of representation might learn from this exercise.
Introduction
Determining normative principles likely to engender autonomous, reflective and consequential decision-making is a matter for democratic theory. Creating meaningful and sustainable innovations in democratic practice entails a range of strategic and pragmatic skills capable of translating theory into political reality. There has been no shortage of blueprints for democratic innovations over the past half century, each seeking to respond to a pervasive mood of disenchantment with the tried and tested mechanisms of democratic governance. Citizens' juries, deliberative polls, consensus conferences, visioning exercises, epetitions and online consultations are but the most famous of numerous attempts to design better ways of giving effective voice to the demos: the citizens whose values and preferences are supposed to be centre stage in all democratic decision-making (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003; Goodin, 2008; Smith, 2009) .
While much experimental energy has been invested in these attempts to devise fresh thinking about ways of enacting popular sovereignty and diminishing the perceived distance between decisions and those affected by them, most recent democratic innovations have been open to a common and forceful criticism: that, as exercises in speculative experimentation, they perform a largely counterfactual role. This is what democracy would be like if the well-informed public were in control, say their proponents. However, while they might create conditions for more sophisticated modes of deliberation and preference formation, there is scarce evidence of such exercises having had a significant influence upon the shaping of policy outcomes. Indeed, most of these democratic innovations have an ephemeral existence, adopted typically as pilot studies, later to be abandoned in favour of politics as usual. Democratic politics depends upon predictable mechanisms rather than exceptional bursts of innovation and, despite the justifiably celebrated social diversity, dialogical force and deliberative sophistication of the latter, the range of innovatory forms that have been adopted cannot be said to have had lasting effects upon either the policy process or durable modes of democratic representation.
Closure of the perceived gap between representatives and represented has been central to democratic innovation. Fung and Wright (2003, p. 3) note that new democratic models aim to transcend narrow practices of representation, facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nation's wealth.
However democratically motivated they claim or aim to be, the very point of representatives is to speak and act in the absence from the scene of decision-making of the citizens who are represented. To represent is to stand in for those who are absent and distant, physically, cognitively or metaphorically (Pitkin, 1967) .
Some commentators have suggested that digital technologies, while possessing no deterministic capacity to shape political relationships, could offer a means of overcoming spatio-temporal distances between representatives and represented. By opening up possibilities for real-time as well as asynchronous interaction between decision-makers and those affected by policy decisions, the need for representation might not be eliminated (because most people lack the time, inclination and perhaps even competence to engage in the complex process of formulating, negotiating and implementing policies likely to affect them), but could be made more direct and dialogical (Coleman, 2004; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Ferro, Loukis, Charalabidis, & Osella, 2013; Karlsson, 2013) .
What happens to representation when digitally enabled participatory practices designed to close the communicative distance between representatives and represented are introduced as a feature of a political system? Such a recasting of the democratic contract would raise important questions at both a theoretical and empirical level. Theoretically, we would want to consider how the potential presence of the represented in the decision-making process affects the legitimacy of representatives' claim to be speaking for those who cannot speak for themselves. Empirically, we would want to observe the extent to which citizens grasp the opportunity to be present in the decision-making process and to which they regard this as a more democratically efficacious form of (self)-representation than the traditional electoral system. Fortunately, an example of such a democratic reform exists that can help us to answer these questions. This is the case of Participatory Budgeting (PB), first established in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, since adopted in over 200 Brazilian cities, and now replicated on many hundreds of occasions in several other parts of the world (Sintomer, Herzberg, Röcke, & Allegretti, 2012) .
PB has been institutionally embedded in several Brazilian municipalities, thereby avoiding the danger of studying a merely ephemeral experiment. Following Fung and Wright's criteria for new forms of representation, PB has recruited new and different types of participants to the policy process; encouraged dialogical communication leading to broadly consensual outcomes; addressed real-world problems of political economy, welfare and well-being; and contributed to a redistribution of power both within the policy process and in terms of distributive justice (Fung & Wright, 2003; Smith, 2009) . While PB has quite rightly been the subject of intense critical scrutiny from the perspectives of democratic normativity and instrumental effectiveness, it cannot be dismissed as a one-off pilot project (Wampler, 2007) .
Research questions and methods
This article focuses upon the online PB (ePB) exercises conducted in the city of Belo Horizonte in 2006 Horizonte in , 2008 Horizonte in , 2011 Horizonte in and 2013 . Our aim is not to provide a comprehensive account of these initiatives; less still to arrive at any definitive conclusions about the value of PB as a democratic model. In focusing upon one city (the sixth largest in Brazil) and one particular form of PB -which can be regarded as an innovation within an innovation, insofar as it involves the use of digital information and communication technologies (ICT) with a view to enhancing democratic representation -we are in a position to analyse a specific change to the representative relationship over a seven-year period. The case of Belo Horizonte's ePB is illuminating for three main reasons. Firstly, it is an example of e-participation that has become politically embedded over seven years and is still operational, thereby providing scope for longitudinal analysis. Secondly, it was the first significant application of evoting in Brazil. And thirdly, over the years, Belo Horizonte's ePB attracted a remarkable number of participants in its first two editions (among 8% of all voters) and then an enormous drop in the number of participants (more than a hundred thousand voters) in the last two editions. In the light of this decline from early popular enthusiasm to more recent public disengagement, we ask two research questions:
(1) Has the response to ePB by the citizens of Belo Horizonte reflected a change in their experience of being represented? (2) What are the challenges likely to face governments seeking to sustain democratic innovations with a view to establishing more direct forms of representation?
We begin by offering an historical account of ePBs in Belo Horizonte. This draws upon research from other scholars, as well as responses to email questionnaires that we sent to City Hall staff and PB/ePB coordinators, aiming to find out from them about (1) their main reasons for introducing ICT to the PB process, (2) their impressions about the consequences of doing so and (3) their perception of the reasons for the more recent decline in public engagement with the ePBs. We received seven responses, including ones from three key figures: the Secretary of Planning and Budget from Belo Horizonte's City Hall, the coordinator and deputy-coordinator of the ePB process. These were followed up by telephone interviews in a second moment.
In order to answer our two research questions, we firstly analysed all the messages posted by citizens in the official ePB online forums during the 2008 (n = 1227), 2011 (n = 1143) and 2013 (n = 189) ePB exercises. We were particularly interested in exploring how the ePB process affected participants' external efficacy and whether they felt that their engagement in the ePB could really affect the results. We wanted to understand the extent to which participants felt that they had achieved what they voted for. We analysed participants' posts to see whether they supported the project that had won most votes; supported the winning project, but with proposed amendments; did not support the winning, but voted for another project; or did not mention any projects at all.
Secondly, we monitored the use of Twitter from 21 November to 11 December 2011 and 4 December to 20 December 2013 (the complete duration of the 2011 and 2013 ePB voting terms). In order to do this, we monitored the official profile of Belo Horizonte city hall on Twitter (@pbhonline) and the use of the hashtags #opdigital and #opdigi-tal2013 for the same period.
1
The emergence and decline of ePB in Belo Horizonte PB was introduced in Belo Horizonte in 1993 by a coalition led by the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT), which had four years earlier initiated the innovation in Porto Alegre. PB enables populations to deliberate about how to allocate a specific share of the city's budget. The process of deliberation, delegation and voting is quite elaborate (see Avritzer, 2002) , but the overall objective is to move control over resource allocation from elected representatives to direct democratic plebiscites (Cabannes, 2003; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007) . From the outset, PB in Belo Horizonte was characterised by two factors. Firstly, it attracted a higher level of public participation than in several other Brazilian municipalities -although this oscillated over the years, depending upon citizens' expectations that the innovation would be sustained, their trust in the municipal government's willingness to implement PB decisions, the decrease of the resources designated to PB and changes in the rules that were imposed over the years (Wampler, 2007) . In the first three years, the number of participants increased significantly from 15,216 in 1994 to 38,508 in 1996. However, it fell in the following year (after a change of Mayor) and, as can be seen from Figure 1 , public engagement with this exercise fluctuated thereafter.
Secondly, those who did participate in the process tended to be poorer and less educated than non-participants (in striking contrast to most experiences of public involvement in governmental policy-making) (Avritzer, 2002; Wampler, 2007) . However, even though PB delegates and participants were disadvantaged in socio-economic terms, they were not politically inactive citizens, since 85% of them were already affiliated to civil society organisations, leading Nylen (2000, p. 90) to conclude that 'PB is not empowering the unorganized'. Thus, the poorest and least organised remained significantly under-represented in PB (Wampler, 2007) .
These factors led the municipal government of Belo Horizonte to think imaginatively about how to increase the overall number of participating citizens; broaden participation beyond the already affiliated and networked; and make it more inviting to conspicuously under-represented groups, including young people and the middle class, neither of which had been inclined to give up their evenings to attend long meetings in community halls during the face-to-face PB process. In 2006, the municipal government decided to run a parallel PB process, which would take place exclusively online. Any citizen with a voter identification (ID) number could go online and participate over a 42-day period. The ePB website provided virtual 'walks' around the city, where citizens could view proposed projects, debate their merits (approximately 1200 messages were posted) and vote for one project to be implemented in each administrative region. A budget of $12 million was allocated to the ePB projects (see Peixoto, 2008; Sampaio, Maia, & Marques, 2011) .
According to Veronica Campos Sales, the ePB Coordinator for Belo Horizonte, moving the process online was intended as a way of reaching a different section of the population:
One of ePB`s challenges was to incorporate new citizens in the PB process and to lead to the involvement of more people in discussions and decisions about the whole city … We wished both to promote the expansion of popular participation and extend the participatory budget process to segments of the population that usually don`t get involved, such as the middle class and youth. (V.C. Sales, personal interview, PB Coordinator, February 4, 2012) For Mayor Pimentel, 2 who initiated the process, the objective was more politically ambitious than extending participation. He regarded the turn to digital communication as a move towards a new kind of democracy:
If we want to create a participatory democracy and not just a representative democracy, we have to be thinking all the time about how to reach the citizens who are not mobilised by the traditional modes … At the beginning, when we established ePB, I thought we were dealing with just another version of PB, but we weren't. What we wanted was to initiate something that we could call digital democracy [ … ] Why can`t the citizen be consulted online, or by his or her cell phone, about, for example, a bill concerning smoking in enclosed places? […] In a society that is gradually more online […] . if the people already vote using an electronic ballot, why we can`t use these same technologies, such as the internet, cell phones etc. to hear the opinion of citizens? (Quoted in Lana, 2011, p. 230) In particular, Pimentel saw this new mode of representation as being likely to motivate younger citizens:
With the implementation of this new modality it has been possible to extend the participation of the community, incorporating youth sectors and spreading the culture of the virtual world as an instrument of democratisation. (OIDP, 2007, p. 21) At the very least, ePB was intended to broaden the range and number of actively participating citizens in the policy process. At a more ambitious level, this innovation in governance was conceived as a step towards a form of more interactive democracy; perhaps even a foundation of digital democracy, in which the structures and processes of political representation would adapt to fit in with the communicative practices of a generation for whom virtual connectivity was becoming the norm.
In the first ePB in 2006, there were 192,229 visits to the website and over 500,000 votes cast by 172,938 citizens of the municipality. (On average, each participant voted for four different projects to be implemented). This means that approximately 10% of Belo Horizonte's registered voters participated in the ePB process, compared with about 4% who participated in the municipality's face-to-face PB in 2005 /2006 (Peixoto, 2008 .
Were the 10% who participated in ePB socio-demographically different from regular PB participants? Curiously, given that a key purpose of the initiative was to recruit specific socio-demographic groups (youth and the middle class), no data were collected by the city hall to find out whether this actually happened. Rather than draw upon any definitive data, researchers are left with a series of clues to the possible effect that ePB had upon the active representation of citizens. Drawing upon the city government's Quality of Life Index (IQVU), Peixoto (2008) has suggested that there was no correlation between socio-demographic variables (such as age or family income) and participation in the 2006 ePB. This suggests that participation was not directly affected by a 'digital divide' in Belo Horizonte, which would certainly have been consistent with sharp differences in the age and income of participants. Based on the different Planning Units (PUs) of Belo Horizonte and the voting numbers of those regions in the 2006 and 2008 ePB, Lana (2011) has attempted to measure the extent of participation by youth and middle-class citizens. By using data from the IQVU and conducting a multivariate linear regression, Lana was able to analyse the influence of income and age (independent variables) upon participation in the 2006 and 2008 ePB (dependent variable). The conclusion of Lana's analysis was that the city hall's objective was partially fulfilled: in 2006, young people were more likely to participate than their elders, but the middle-class citizens were not; in 2008, both youth and middle-class citizens were more likely to participate in ePB voting process than the rest of the population.
Even though evidence that ePB extended the range of represented citizens in the governance of Belo Horizonte remains tentative, what is manifestly clear is that ePB became less popular each time it was tried. As shown in Figure 2 , the number of citizens who voted in the ePB process fell from 172,938 in 2006 to 124,320 in 2008 to 25,378 in 2011 -(a decline of about 85%) and to 8900 in 2013. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the decline in ePB participation was much steeper than the decline in PB participation over the same period. 
Did citizens feel better represented?
While never intended as an alternative to political representation, PB was conceived from the outset as a means of changing the terms of the representative contract by allowing citizens to move beyond simply electing politicians to make decisions on their behalf about the allocation of local resources. The ethos of PB is that citizens determine policy for themselves by voting to allocate local resources to projects which they have first discussed and then prioritised in order of popular support.
Explaining how ePB failed to appeal to citizens as a more participatory form of representative democracy raises important questions about what it means to feel well represented. We would argue that it entails at least three kinds of experience. Firstly, a sense that one belongs to a community of represented citizens capable of defining who they are and what they stand for. Secondly, an awareness of the opportunities and appropriate times for making one's voice heard. This is a communication challenge, calling upon a range of mediating technologies that call attention to the presence of a potentially collective 'we' which has rights and responsibilities in relation to its own representation. And thirdly, a belief that one's democratic actions can make a difference; that there is a line of communication between oneself and the authorities who make and implement political decisions (see Coleman, 2013 , for an elaboration of this argument). Our analysis of the three ePB exercises in Belo Horizonte leads us to suggest that they were lacking on all three of these counts.
Barriers to entry
A fundamental prerequisite of any form of effective representation is that the represented are able to contribute to the democratic process without encountering barriers. When technologies are employed as a means of enabling participation -as in the case of casting a vote or contributing to an online discussion space -, one of their key democratic functions should be to facilitate rather than impede the expression of views and preferences. However, so-called participatory technologies can, have unintended effects. Given that the design of tools and their rules of use always embody implicit values that will affect the ways that people use them, it is important to understand the implicit values that are materialised in ostensibly democratic technologies (Macintosh, Gordon, & Renton, 2009 ). In the case of Belo Horizonte's ePB, successive changes of socio-legal design served to undermine the principle of inclusive participation that the process was intended to enhance.
All of our interviewees emphasised that modifications to the design and regulation of the ePB process were probably responsible for a decline in participation between 2006 and 2011. In 2006, anyone could take part and vote in the ePB by simply providing their voter ID number. In 2008, the entry threshold was raised: participants were required to type in a random series of letters before voting, as well as producing their voter IDs. By 2011 (and again in 2013) , citizens wishing to participate in the ePB were required to download a security app, produce two voter ID numbers (electoral and personal), their email address and then confirm it on a separate occasion -and then answer personal questions about their age and gender. This change was introduced by legal officers of the state -the General Auditor of the Municipality and the Brazilian Public Prosecutor -in response to allegations of corrupt practice in the 2006 and especially 2008 ePB. According to the Secretary in charge of the ePB process in Belo Horizonte (G. Herzog, E-mail interview, Secretariat, October 25, 2012), the introduction of greater hurdles to being counted as a legitimate citizen may well have deterred people from participating.
While the Mayor was appealing to a rhetoric of transformed, inclusive citizenship and digitally enhanced accessible democracy, the design and regulation of the ePB process seemed to be inflected by an ethos of intense apprehension. Indeed, by the 2011 ePB, even non-online voting options, such as free-toll phone or SMS voting, were considered too insecure to be implemented. As we shall argue in the conclusion, the framing of communication tools as either sources of or barriers to democratisation all too frequently draws upon a discourse of technological determinism that fails to take account of the extent to which they are shaped by politically contestable values.
Limits of reach and attention
Before any system of democratic representation can speak to, with or for citizens, it must come to their attention. This is a communication challenge facing any government seeking to promote common knowledge (Rogers & Storey, 1987) . Embedding a democratic innovation in public consciousness is no easy task, especially if the motive for introducing it is to 'reach citizens who are not mobilised by traditional forms of participation' (Pimentel). For this group to be engaged, there was need for a publicity strategy that would make them aware of the possibility of participation -even if this was not information they would normally be seeking or thought that they needed.
In the contemporary era, public information campaigns are most commonly conducted via the mass media, for these are the main sources of common knowledge for people who are not already politically engaged. According to Cabannes (2003) , the main media used by Brazilian municipalities to make citizens aware of the PB process were local newspapers (75%), local radio (74%), loudspeaker vans (74%), mass mailings (67%) and posters (58%). Television (17%) was much less commonly used.
When ePB was introduced in Belo Horizonte, the same focus upon local media continued (with local newspaper and leaflets), but it was supplemented by a strategy intended to reach citizens in the whole city, firstly using mass media ads (TV and radio) and secondly via digital communication networks (OIDP, 2007) . This strategy was based on the assumption that the two most significant target groups -young people and the middle class -were the most likely to be users of digital networks. According to the ePB coordinators, local blogs, social networks sites (SNSs), emails and SMS were used widely to tell people why they should and how they could become involved in ePB. Indeed, officials claimed that as many as 3 million SMS messages were sent out to over 1 million cell phones alert people to the 2011 ePB (G. Herzog, E-mail interview, Secretariat, October 25, 2012). There were also online forums set up in which citizens could debate the merits of various projects and these attracted around 1000 posts in each edition from 2006 to 2011 (Sampaio et al., 2011) , but only 189 in 2013.
Given that such energy and resources were committed to publicising ePB, why did participation decline? The strategy failed for three main reasons. Firstly, the digital communication campaign came to replace rather than supplement a mass media strategy. In 2006, the ePB was widely publicised in the press and on radio and television, partly through paid official advertising (G. Herzog, E-mail interview, Secretariat, October 25, 2012; V.C. Sales, personal interview, PB Coordinator, February 4, 2012), but mainly because it was 'news'. The mass media were fascinated by the arrival of a local innovation -one that was ahead of other cities in Brazil and allowed journalists and politicians to discuss whether the Internet would make a difference to the level and composition of public participation. During and shortly after it took place, the ePB took centre stage in the mediated public sphere, with ads from the city government proudly proclaiming, 'You can be proud of it -Belo Horizonte is the first city to adopt digital participatory budgeting'. This clearly contributed to a level of public awareness that resulted in the 2006 ePB engaging more citizens than previous PB exercises. In 2008, the municipal government continued to advertise the ePB in the mass media, but it was no longer a novelty. By 2011, a decision was made not to target the mass media (G. Herzog, E-mail interview, Secretariat, October 25, 2012; V.C. Sales, personal interview, PB Coordinator, February 4, 2012). ePB publicity was combined with general advertising from City Hall. In 2013, they used the TV ads once again, combined with other City Hall's publicity (D. Oliveira, telephone interview, PB Coordinator, February 19, 2014; V.C. Sales, telephone interview, PB Coordinator, February 19, 2014) and by this time, citizens were becoming more sceptical towards ePB. The online publicity campaign in 2011 and 2013 mainly replaced rather than supplemented appeals via the mass media.
Secondly, as publicity moved online, the city government found itself mainly appealing to people who were already in touch with it. The city government's database comprised contact details of people who had already communicated with it and/or had registered their email addresses or cell phone numbers. Local citizens who were the most disengaged from the affairs of local government were the least likely to have registered their addresses with it in the past and were therefore effectively doubly excluded from the cycle of participation.
This was exacerbated by a third factor: instead of creating profiles on social networking sites where people might already be discussing civic or political issues, the city government directed all online traffic to its official online site, thereby isolating itself from the vibrancy of popular conversation. During the voting period of the 2011 ePB (21 November to 11 December), the City Hall's official Twitter profile posted only 39 messages about ePB and did not enter into any dialogue with citizens; it merely retweeted profiles of the city's daily newspapers when they commented on the ePB. The city government's official profiles hardly proved to be popular: its Twitter profile had around 8000 followers and its Facebook page around 2000 'likes'. This was reflected in the low engagement in SNSs. For example, the hashtag #opdigital, used by the city government on Twitter had only 182 posts. Of these, 50 were posted by local government officials and 25 by local political representatives. Only 99 messages were posted by individual citizens or civic associations. In 2013, the situation was the same. The ePB website received about 1.5 thousand Facebook 'likes' and 150 tweets mentions to the main page. The official City Hall Twitter profile (22,000 followers in 2013) tweeted 93 times in 2013, often trying to make newsworthy statements, but the surrounding online engagement was negligible, with only 11 messages using the 'official' hashtag #opdigital2013, two using #opdigital and 45 messages adopting 'opdigital'.
While one may argue correctly on Twitter bias or about it not being representative of Belo Horizonte's population, our intention is not to make general conclusions regarding the city population. Rather, we are showing evidence how the city town administration failed to create any relevant mass of critical engagement in Twitter regarding ePB options and realisation. Thereby, failing to reach a broader audience of potential participants.
Feelings of political efficacy
For citizens to feel that they are being democratically represented, they need to believe that there is a meaningful relationship between their input to the political sphere and policy outputs. The term political efficacy was conceived to refer to people's subjective belief that a communicative relationship exists between themselves and the institutions that govern society. A political efficacious person is able 'to construct a psychic map of the political world with strong lines of force running from himself to the place of officialdom' (Easton & Dennis, 1967, p. 26) . Various studies have reported that those who feel that they can exert effective political influence, individually or in concert with others, are more likely to be actively involved in politics than those who do not (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; Milbrath, 1965; Sullivan & Riedel, 2004) .
On the face of it, PB would seem to be an ideal mechanism for generating political efficacy. Given a clear mandate to determine how local resources will be allocated, we might expect participating citizens to come out of the process feeling more confident about their own capacity to affect decisions (referred to as internal efficacy) and the openness of political institutions to hearing and learning from them (external efficacy). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that this is precisely what happened. Surveys of the population of Belo Horizonte conducted by Wampler and Avritzer (2004, pp. 305-306) found that 60% of respondents said that they relied on politicians to act for them in securing public goods before PB was introduced, whereas after the experience of PB, 60% of respondents stated that they were able to gain access to the resources they needed by participating in the new democratic process themselves and 67% said that they were no longer dependent upon politicians' interventions in order to secure public goods. In short, PB undermined the clientelist tradition of politics in Belo Horizonte whereby the principal-agent relationship had come to be based on a spiral of favour seeking and granting. By introducing a new technology of participation to the process, ePB might have been expected to enhance even further such foundations for political efficacy.
Contrary to that expectation, all of the interviewees we spoke to identified the apparent failure to implement ePB decisions as a major cause of public disenchantment with the process. The most popularly supported project (voted for by 48,000 citizens) in the 2008 ePB had still not been enacted in 2011 when the third ePB took place and remained unimplemented at the time of the 2013 ePB. Faced with this record of decisions voted for and then not implemented, it was hardly surprising that citizens felt less motivated to vote.
We have analysed the online ePB forums with a view to identifying expressed feelings of external efficacy. The results are displayed in Table 1 .
In 2008, almost 40% of the messages presented some reference to external efficacy and 35% indicated that posters felt more able to influence policy in local politics. In 2011, expressions of external efficacy fell to 20% of all online messages. Of those, most showed a feeling of being less able to influence the final decisions of the ePB. Specifically, 77 (6.7%) messages in 2011 mentioned the project that won in 2008, but was not implemented:
Why should I add to the votes or post my opinions on this ePB? There are several discrepancies that need to be explained. (M.A., 28/11/2011 (M.A., 28/11/ , ePB, 2011 In 2013, the number of positive feelings about ePB expressed online stood at 38.6% of the total, but the number of negative feelings stood at 28%. According to V.C. Sales (telephone interview, PB Coordinator, February 19, 2014), ePB faces a bigger challenge than face-toface PB because of its relatively recent introduction and the fact that people cannot see any direct consequences of their voting. She believes that the main challenge of ePB is implementing projects faster in order to restore the trust of citizens.
We have analysed the online messages to see how far posters approved of the projects chosen by the City Hall to be voted on in ePBs (Table 2) .
These results show clearly that posters' trust in the government's management of the ePB process declined precipitously: whereas in 2008 70.8% of all messages showed explicit approval for the projects selected by the City Hall, in 2011, this fell to 37% and by 2013, it was as low as 13.2%. At the same time, the number of messages suggesting minor alterations to suggested projects increased from 14% in 2008 to 24% in 2011 and 20.1% in 2013. Disapproval of the selected projects increased from 10.6% in 2008 10.6% in to 27.6% in 2011 10.6% in and 32.3% in 2013 10.6% in . In 2011 10.6% in and 2013 .7% and 52.3% of all messages were not satisfied with the preselected projects and either proposed an amended project or supported a project that was not available to be voted on.
Finally, we observe qualitatively that proposals for changes in the selected projects were expressed in significantly different ways between 2008 and 2011. While in 2008 most messages criticising the projects were calling for different implementation deadlines, in 2011 (27.6%) and 2013 (32.2%), most of these messages comprised complaints relating to the social irrelevance or low impact of the selected projects for the whole city: L., 22/11/2011 L., 22/11/ , ePB 2011 In the 2013 ePB, particular frustration was expressed because one of the three projects on offer was of the most general nature -'the building of a multi-use space for sport, culture and leisure' -and there was no indication as to where this would be located. This 'open' option generated feelings of suspicion towards the City Hall:
I didn't understand what they were talking about. They want to build a multiuse space at an estimated cost of 50 million [Brazilian currency], but they don't say where, the size, they don't show pictures or details. The City Hall has still not implemented the approved project from previous years. How do they want to do this one … (I.C.O.S., 03/12/2013 03/12/ , ePB 2013 The scope of the projects is ridiculously generic, especially for such elevated costs. How can we vote on something when we do not know where and how it will be built? (S., 11/12/2013 (S., 11/12/ , ePB 2013 . Indeed, there are two respects in which inefficacy were built into Belo Horizonte's ePB, even before the failure to implement the winning 2008 project. Firstly, the gatekeeper role of the city council in relation to the ePB website made the process feel less empowering in many respects than the offline PB. Whereas the latter involved live, physical interaction that simply cannot be easily managed, the ePB site was constructed in such a way that users were placed in a responsive rather than proactive role. The city government did not respond to messages from citizens or encourage citizens to engage with one another and share content. Secondly, before even reaching the stage of debating competing projects, citizens were excluded from the prior stage of determining which projects could be voted upon. In this sense, citizens were from the outset forced to engage with an agenda that was not of their own.
Conclusion: sustaining a democratic institution
The city government of Belo Horizonte is committed to sustaining ePB as a feature of democratic governance. It is not alone: many of the most recent attempts to adopt PB in countries beyond Brazil have opted for a significant online element to the process (Sampaio & Peixoto, 2014) . ePB is moving beyond the stage of innovatory novelty. Building a democratic institution entails establishing a predictable political mechanism, the outcomes of which provide a reliable environment in which social interaction can take place securely (Offe, 1999) . If ePB is to be embedded as a mode of more direct representation, what can governments do to avoid the problems that have contributed to declining public trust and participation in the Belo Horizonte ePB? Firstly, the terms upon which citizens are acknowledged as eligible participants must be thought through and made clear. These should be neither too lax nor excessively onerous. The ease of entry to the 2006 ePB was seen as providing risky opportunities for corrupt practices to take place. This undermined the democratic legitimacy of the process. The increasingly demanding requirements facing voters between 2008 and 2013 were regarded as having deterred some eligible voters from participating. All electoral situations (offline and in person as well as online and remote) entail a trade-off between accessibility and security. Striking this balance should be a matter for careful policy reflection before the online innovation is institutionalised. Citizens are likely to accept reasonable and carefully explained security provisions, but if these are suddenly bolted on to the process, often in response to legalistic wrangling, they can have the unwanted effect of diminishing trust in the process.
Distracting, rhetorical invocations of the supposed deterministic effects of digital technologies, whether imagined as panacea or high risk, are unhelpful. Those entrusted with the design of a new political process need to understand that its technological infrastructure is itself a product of design intentions. The construction of online deliberation and decision-making technologies do not merely enable forms of political participation, but define and constrain their scope (Coleman & Moss, 2012) .
Secondly, public engagement with any new democratic process depends upon its visibility and framing within both mainstream mass media and new social media networks. Persuading the local media to publicise an ePB when it is a novelty is relatively easy. Sustaining an ongoing link to the local media ecology entails more than issuing occasional press releases. At the level of mainstream local media, newspaper opinion pages and broadcast studios can become fora for vibrant debate about the pros and cons of competing ePB projects. Governments could be using the media to explain precisely how they are going about implementing projects that have been voted for.
Online networks are bound to play a key role in this ongoing conversation, but that should not be to the exclusion of the press and broadcast media -which, in almost every city and country, remain the main source of local news. Rather than adopting a policy of urging citizens to register as members of its own official networks -often on the assumption that these can be more easily 'managed' -, ePB organisers should engage actively with already existing civic networks. And where these do not exist, citizens should be encouraged -and, if necessary, incentivised -to initiate such networks with a view to speaking for themselves to one another rather than as 'guests' within a government-managed space. The notion that an ePB happens once every two or three years needs to be abandoned; the final decisions might be made at such intervals, but the supporting communication environment within which such decisions are arrived at should be permanent.
Thirdly, although we recognise that participants of online forums are not representative of the whole population of Belo Horizonte, we believe that our analysis provides some indicative evidence of how feelings of external political efficacy decreased significantly from 2008 to 2013 and at the same time how the level of disapproval of preselected projects increased over the same period.
We speculate with some confidence that there is a relationship between the experience of participating in an ePB and of witnessing outcomes and that the extent to which citizens feel that they can influence decisions may well be the most significant predictor of whether they will feel moved to participate in a decision-making process. While the flow from political will to policy implementation is rarely smooth, and there are surely times when the best-made democratic mandates cannot be enacted, governments need to understand that the institutional sustainability of ePB depends as much on subjective perceptions as procedural technicalities.
In the case of Belo Horizonte, all three of these conditions call for attention before this new democratic institution can be made sustainable. Assuming that public confidence in ePB can be realised over time, the normative political question of whether this could lead, in the words of Mayor Pimentel, to the creation of 'a participatory democracy and not just a representative democracy' remains to be answered.
Our argument in this paper has been that the evolution of a democratic innovation into a sustainable feature of governance calls for critical attention to ways of generating and sustaining a popular feeling that the terms of representation have changed for the better. In this regard, we are impressed by Rothstein's (1999) discussion of the notion of 'collective memory'. The essence of this argument is that feelings of popular identity with an institution do not simply arise from an amorphous entity called 'culture', but are constructed and disseminated by strategically acting agents with a view to fulfilling specific political goals. If the aim of ePB is to strengthen civic participation, while making political representation more direct, then as much effort must be put into persuading citizens to absorb such values as in refining the procedural technicalities of the process. Currently an implicit feature of its structural design, the normative aims of ePB need to be embedded not only in the design of the new institution, but also as part of the collective memories of citizens being called upon to move from clientelist to democratic political orientations.
Notes
1. For this third analysis, two Ph.D. students were in charge of coding. Firstly, for the intercoder reliability test, they codded separately a representative sample of all messages. They had agreed at least in 91% of all cases (Krippendorf's α = .757) and disagreements were resolved through discussion. 2. Fernando Pimentel who had been the Mayor of Belo Horizonte was elected governor of Minas Gerais in 2014 and was not available to be interviewed by us. Thus, we decided to use Lana's (2011) interview with him, which was conducted in 2010 (when he was no longer Belo Horizonte's mayor). We believe it captures the main objectives of proposing a digital version of PB and his vision on digital democracy. As Lana's work is not available in English and we have his consent to use the interview, we believe it as an important complement to our data.
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